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The Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster, which occurred seven 
years ago in March 2011, sent waves of shock throughout the world.  
The disaster was triggered by an earthquake and tsunami, two 
natural disasters of extraordinary scale, one in a century and in a 
millennium, respectively, in this region of Japan. Yet, it may have 
been surprising that such a disaster could have happened in Japan, a 
country known for its science and technology, engineering and high 
educational attainment.   
 
The failure that accounted for the disaster and its aftermath was one 
of governance rather than of technology and engineering.  The 
regulatory and legal framework that allowed this failure of 
governance was found to be toothless and ineffective due to 
collusion between the nuclear industry, ministries and regulators of 
the Government of Japan.  The National Diet of Japan Fukushima 
Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC), 
of which author Dr. Kiyoshi Kurokawa served as Chairman, 
concluded that this man-made disaster was a case of regulatory 
capture, in which the Japanese nuclear regulatory agencies, agencies 
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of the Government, served the interests of the nuclear power 
industry, instead of protecting the safety of the public. 
 
Since the Commission published its final report and submitted its 
recommendations to the National Diet in July 2012, little progress 
of significance can be observed.  Major problems at the Fukushima 
plant have yet to be resolved, such as leakages of radioactive 
substances into the environs and the Pacific Ocean and the search 
and plan for nuclear core meltdown debris are yet to be seen, while 
the bigger issues of governance, such as lack of transparency and 
openness are also ongoing.   
 
In September 2012, the regulatory bodies at the time of the accident, 
the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) and the Nuclear 
Safety Commission (NSC), were replaced by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Authority (NRA), now under the Ministry of the 
Environment.  Unfortunately, this has not been making significant 
progress, only amounting to cosmetic changes.  Thus, the NRA has 
not demonstrated sufficient independence or transparency.  I have 
personally heard the accounts of many internationally recognized 
experts who have stated that Japanese nuclear safety requirements 
remain inferior to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
standards. 
 
In spite of much reason to doubt the effectiveness of the reforms, 
more nuclear power plants are currently on track for approval to 
NSA restarted.  At the time of writing this article, four nuclear 
reactors were in operation: Units 1 and 2 of the Sendai Power Plant 
in Kagoshima Prefecture, which came back online in 2015,1 and 
Units 3 and 4 of the Takahama Power Plant, which were restarted in 
20162 and after a temporary shutdown, 3 allowed to operate again in 
                                               
1 Press Release, The Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. (Kyuden), Return to 
Commercial Operation of Sendai Nuclear Power Unit No. 2 (Nov. 17, 2015) 
http://www.kyuden.co.jp/en_information_151117.html [https://perma.cc/8JS4-
2Z4C]. 
2 At the Takahama Power Plant, Unit 3 was restarted on January 29, 2016 and 
Unit 4 on February 26, 2016.  However, they were temporarily taken offline after 
Unit 4 experienced an automatic shutdown just a few days later on February 29.  
Subsequently, the Otsu District Court issued an injunction halting their operation. 
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2017.4  A further nineteen reactors have applied to the NRA to be 
approved for restarting operations. In Saga Prefecture, the Genkai 
plant, Units 3 and 4, are expected to be restarted later in 2017.5 
Genkai Unit 3 started March 23rd, 2018, but stopped one week later 
due to leakage of water pipeline. 
 
To understand the reasons for the lack of significant progress in 
policy reforms, it is necessary to go beyond the legal changes and 
examine the underlying institutional factors.  Doing so exposes the 
reality that the structures of regulatory capture6 are still firmly 
maintained.  This paper first reviews the work of the NAIIC 
investigation and then examines issues with the regulatory 
framework of the nuclear industry in Japan.  It then delves into the 
institutional factors and societal background that laid out the 
groundwork for the nuclear disaster to occur.  It argues that in 
addition to greater reform of safety regulations, the mindset shared 
by many Japanese that underlies many organizations in Japan must 
undergo major change to transform into one that encourages more 
diversity and upholds the obligation to dissent.  Above all, the 
principles of responsibility and accountability to the public must be 
followed on individual and institutional levels to corporate and the 
government.  If such changes are not made, another Fukushima 
disaster may happen again.  In an increasingly globalizing world, 
the international consequences of national crises are tremendous—
risking reputations of nations, those involved in nuclear industry 
and policy, and beyond.  In order to avoid facing another 
                                                                                                           
3 Press Release, The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. (KEPCO), Takahama Unit 4 
Automatic Reactor Trip (Feb. 29, 2016) 
http://www.kepco.co.jp/english/corporate/pr/2016/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2016/02/2
9/2016_feb29_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5E6B-SRMJ]. 
4 Press Release, The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. (KEPCO), Decision on 
petition of appeal pertaining to temporary restraining order against provisional 
disposition order pertaining to demand of injunction preventing resumption of 
operation of Units 3 and 4 of Takahama Nuclear Power Station (Mar. 28, 2017) 
http://www.kepco.co.jp/english/corporate/ir/brief/pdf/2017_mar28_2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2KCM-4XKE]. 
5 World Nuclear News, Court ruling clears path for restart of Genkai units (Jun. 
13, 2017) http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Court-ruling-clears-path-for-
restart-of-Genkai-units-1306174.html [https://perma.cc/LSJ5-JJAV]. 
6 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 The Bell J. of Econ. 3, 
(1971). 
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catastrophe, we must not let this crisis go to waste and must apply 
the lessons learned. 
 
II. The Mandate and Principles of NAIIC 
 
NAIIC was the first parliamentary independent investigation 
commission since Japan became a constitutional democracy.  In 
order to ensure the independence of the legislative, executive and 
judicial branches of the Government, commissions of this kind that 
investigate significant state matters are a regular part of many 
democracies.  However, NAIIC was ground-breaking, as it was the 
first in Japan. The establishment of NAIIC and the selection of its 
ten commissioners were mandated by the National Diet, through a 
law enacted on September 30, 2011.  The Commission officially 
began its investigation on December 8, 2011 and submitted its 
report7 to both Chairs of two Houses of the National Diet on July 5, 
2012, in “approximately six months” as stipulated by the law.  The 
law mandated the Commission with “the legal power to request the 
submission of relevant documents and the power to request the Joint 
Council of the Houses of Representatives and Councilors to invoke 
parliamentary investigation rights”.8 
 
The Commission was based on the principles of transparency and 
commitment to the people, the future and the world.  There were 
nineteen Commission meetings, which held hearings with thirty-
eight key individuals, and which all held press briefings that were 
                                               
7 Along with the official Japanese report, NAIIC submitted the Executive 
Summary written in English which describes the key points of the full report 
(Main Report) to the global audience.  In October 2012, the entire English 
translation of the full report was released.  Both the Executive Summary and the 
Main Report are available in pdf format on the NAIIC website, http://naiic.org 
[https://perma.cc/5L5H-T3EL].  The Main Report is split into chapters and 
readers can access each chapter in pdf or html form.  NAIIC, Reports (Sept. 12, 
2012), http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/report/ 
[https://perma.cc/FH8F-JVU2]. 
8NAIIC, THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL DIET OF JAPAN 
FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION 
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open to the public and media and were broadcast online with a 
simultaneous English translation.  In addition to the nineteen 
meetings, NAIIC conducted approximately 900 hours of interviews 
and hearings with more than 1,000 people.  It conducted surveys 
with responses from more than 10,000 evacuees and 2,400 plant 
workers, held three town hall meetings and made visits to nuclear 
plants and three research missions overseas. 
 
The NAIIC Report was made available online in both English and 
Japanese, as well as a book published by Tokuma-Shoten.  
Additionally, a short video animation series9 explaining the NAIIC 
investigation and report in both languages was created by university 
students, which can also be viewed online. 
 
III. Findings of the NAIIC Report: Regulatory Capture 
 
The main findings of the investigation were the underlying 
structures of regulatory capture in the nuclear power sector in Japan.  
The Commission examined the relationship between the operators 
and regulators and concluded that the two main regulatory bodies, 
NSC and NISA, failed to carry out their responsibilities of 
developing and enforcing safety requirements to protect the public.  
Fearing that new regulatory requirements would interfere with their 
operations and weaken their position in lawsuits, TEPCO opposed 
them by lobbying the regulators and government through the 
Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC).   
 
But fundamentally, the lack of autonomy from industry interests 
was built into both organizations from the start. NISA, the main 
regulatory agency, lacked independence due to its ill-fated 
establishment as an organization originally a part of the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which actively promoted the 
nuclear power industry.10  Similarly, NSC, the advisory body 
                                               
9 See NAIIC, Home (Oct. 31, 2013), http://naiic.net/en/ [https://perma.cc/SF4S-
2X45] (containing illustrated videos explaining what happened in the Fukushima 
nuclear accident). 
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responsible for creating the nuclear safety guidelines, was first set 
up as part of the Science and Technology Agency (STA), an 
organization established in the 1950s to help promote the nuclear 
industry in Japan.  NSC neglected to establish legally obligatory 
safety regulations. 
 
The investigation found that NISA failed to carry out its 
responsibilities of enforcing utility companies to adhere to nuclear 
safety regulations.  NISA gave tacit consent to allow the operators 
to choose voluntarily whether to apply countermeasures against 
severe accidents, including external events.  Crucial to the 
Fukushima accident, although NISA required nuclear operators to 
conduct seismic safety assessments (called “seismic back-checks”) 
and submit reports to them on the status of the nuclear power plants, 
they did not require operators to retroactively apply new regulatory 
requirements to existing plants (the so-called “back-fitting” system).  
The legal framework to enforce back-fitting was simply never put in 
place, by regulators, ministries or government.  Thus, even as 
international safety standards progressively changed, old nuclear 
power plants in Japan could avoid updating their safety levels, 
leaving them vulnerable to earthquakes and other natural disasters. 
 
The consequences of the lack of regulatory enforcement culminated 
in the Fukushima accident.  NISA and METI required seismic back-
checks to be held at the Fukushima nuclear power plant after NSC 
revised the 1981 “Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design 
of Nuclear Power Facilities” in 2006.  Following this, in 2009, 
TEPCO submitted interim reports that showed Units 1 through 4 at 
the Fukushima nuclear power plant had extremely limited seismic 
safety facilities.  However, TEPCO did not release any further 
reports, making an internal decision to extend the deadline for the 
final report from June 2009 to January 2016.  NISA was aware of 
the need to conduct anti-seismic structural reinforcement 
recommended by the revised guidelines on the facilities.  Yet, NISA 
tacitly consented to the delay of the further back-checks and left it 
to the discretion of TEPCO to decide whether to implement the 
reinforcements.  Indeed, the Commission investigation found that 
the reinforcements had not been implemented in Units 1 through 3 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss2/2
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in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.11  In this sense, the 
negligence and collusion of the regulator and industry produced a 
precarious situation, providing the foundation for the man-made 
disaster to occur. 
 
Although based on indirect evidence, the Commission suggested 
there was a possibility that the earthquake caused significant 
damage in Unit 1 of the Fukushima Daiichi power plant before the 
tsunami.  In contrast, TEPCO has claimed that the damage was 
caused by the tsunami, which they could not have foreseen and 
therefore could not have done more to prevent the accident.  
However, as Japan is a country that is particularly prone to 
earthquakes, it would be prudent for the authorities to seriously 
consider this possibility for all other nuclear power plants in Japan.  
The Commission recommended that a third party should continue to 
investigate this issue. 
 
Moreover, NSC guidelines were lenient and neglected to provide 
regulatory requirements for cases of severe accidents.  Accordingly, 
in its list of safety risks to consider, TEPCO omitted the risk of a 
severe accident.  Specifically of importance to the Fukushima 
accident, the guidelines did not consider the possibility of a 
prolonged blackout of a nuclear power station.  Reflecting this, 
TEPCO’s manual for the emergency response to a severe accident 
did not have instructions for the case of a prolonged station blackout 
and power loss scenarios.12  This negligence was fatal, as it was a 
blackout in the nuclear power station that was the first step in the 
long chain of events in the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.  
Additionally, NSC also did not consider other issues such as the 
security of nuclear power plants and the spent-fuel stockpile, which 
are an obvious target for terrorists through physical and cyber-
attacks.  Overall, as the NAIIC Report concluded, 
                                               
11 Id. at 4; NAIIC Report, Executive Summary, 16 (2012), 
https://www.nirs.org/wp-content/uploads/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S4C5-D78V]. 
12 NAIIC Report, Chapter 1, 38, 
http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/NAIIC_Eng_Chapter1_web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/45ML-C4JR]; NAIIC Report, Executive Summary, supra note 
11, at 33. 
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Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), as the 
nuclear operator, the Nuclear Safety Commission 
(NSC) and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety 
Agency (NISA) as the regulatory authorities, and 
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI), as the government body promoting 
nuclear power, all failed to correctly prepare and 
implement the most basic safety requirements . . . 
13 
 
IV. Policy Recommendations by NAIIC and Responses by 
Governmental Agencies 
 
Based upon its findings, NAIIC provided policy recommendations 
on the legal and regulatory aspects involving the operation of 
nuclear power, as well as on governance and crisis management.  
The seven recommendations are listed in the Appendix A to this 
paper.  Regarding legal reform, NAIIC recommended that an 
integrated legal framework be established in order to avoid the 
confusion of multiple laws and government agencies.  The laws 
must define the roles of the nuclear operators, require regular and 
timely reviews as well as “back-fitting.”  The Commission also set 
out criteria for new regulatory bodies to follow, including a high 
degree of independence, transparency, requirement for regulatory 
bodies to report to the National Diet on their decision-making 
processes and the prohibition of stakeholder involvement.  
Furthermore, it recommended the National Diet to monitor the 
nuclear regulatory agencies by calling them to explanatory hearings 
to the Diet, tracking their progress and implementation of the 
recommendations. 
 
After the NAIIC Report was submitted to the National Diet in July 
2012, governmental bodies were prompted to introduce some 
changes but they have been formalities at the minimum required 
level.  The NRA, now under the Ministry of the Environment, was 
established to replace NISA and NSC in September 2012.  
Additionally, some laws were amended in June 2012 to include new 
                                               
13 NAIIC Report, supra note 8, at 10.  
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regulatory requirements on nuclear safety, which went into effect in 
July 2013.  These requirements introduced the “back-fitting” 
system, measures against terrorism, and combined some nuclear 
safety regulations (the Electricity Business Act, for periodic 
inspections, was incorporated into the Reactor Regulation Act)14. 
 
Although the most pressing and basic amendments were made, there 
has been little monitoring by the National Diet and interest in 
reforms has largely disappeared.  After the submission of the NAIIC 
Report, the House of Representatives of the Diet has only called 
upon Commission members to speak at a hearing on one occasion.  
Moreover, the House of Councilors has yet to take substantial 
action.  Thus, the National Diet has done little to monitor the new 
regulatory agency.  In his book 3.11: Disaster and Change of Japan 
(2013), Professor Richard Samuels, who specialises in Japanese 
politics, argues that few signs of change can be seen in politics and 
general democratic processes in Japan since the Fukushima 
disaster.15  One positive development was that in May 2017, I was 
appointed the Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Special 
Committee of seven memberes on the Investigation of Nuclear 
Power Isssues in the House of Representaties as recommended by 
NAIIC report.16 Yet, this is just the beginning of a long process and 
much more work need to e done.  
 
Moreover, a review of the NRA in January 2016, conducted by the 
IAEA, deemed that the nuclear safety law needed to be amended to 
make on-site safety checks more effective.  In the review, the IAEA 
also inspected Japanese nuclear facilities, including the Fukushima 
plant.  The leader of the mission, Philippe Jamet, a French 
regulatory commissioner, stated that the inspection rules at Japanese 
nuclear facilities were inflexible and did not allow a quick response 
in case of a problem.  At a press conference, Jamet said that Japan 
has a comprehensive framework but, “it doesn't give enough 
freedom for the inspectors to react immediately and to provide 
                                               
14 Nuclear Regulation Authority, New Regulatory Requirements for Light-Water 
Nuclear Power Plants—Outline 2 (August 2013), 
http://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000067212.pdf [https://perma.cc/DEQ3-ME96]. 
15 RICHARD J. SAMUELS, 3.11: DISASTER and CHANGE in JAPAN (2013). 
16 NAIIC Report, supra note 8. 
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results . . . At any time and for any plant, inspectors should be 
allowed to go where they want.”17 
 
Japan has a responsibility to the international community for 
upholding the highest levels of safety and transparency in regulating 
its nuclear power plants.  As nuclear power plant accidents such as 
Fukushima and Chernobyl have proved, nuclear power has far-
reaching consequences not only for the country, but for the world.  
Especially as globalization progresses, unexpected, black swan 
events can have larger impacts and risks.  The construction of 
nuclear power plants is increasing, particularly in emerging 
economies such as China, Turkey and even the United Kingdom.  
Thus, it is ever important to establish and monitor regulatory 
structures, through which we can avoid the same mistakes and 
networks of collusion as occurred in Japan.  As Winston Churchill 
once stated, “Every crisis should be an opportunity,” and we must 
apply the lessons learned from the Fukushima disaster to avoid 
future crises.   
 
Moreover, it is not only international and governmental 
organizations that should be involved but also the public, which 
should have a heightened sense of awareness of these significant 
issues.  Civil society can play an important role, not only in the 
aftermath of crises, but on the everyday level, in being critical of 
their governments and upholding the obligation to dissent, which I 
will explain in the next section. 
 
V. Context of Institutional Culture in Japan 
 
In order to understand how the regulatory capture of the nuclear 
industry in Japan was formed, the context of the institutional and 
societal factors in Japan must be explained.  In the chapter on the 
Fukushima disaster in his excellent book, Bending Adversity, David 
Pilling writes accurately, “the accident exposed in a flash—quite 
                                               
17 Mari Yamaguchi, U.S. News, “The International Atomic Energy Agency says 
Japan has improved its nuclear safety regulation since the 2011 Fukushima 
disaster, but it still needs to strengthen inspections and staff competency” (Jan. 
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literally—some of the worst traits of ‘old Japan,’ with its elitist and 
secretive bureaucratic culture.  That culture had served Japan 
reasonably well in the post-war years when it was driving economic 
catch-up.  But it was deeply flawed.”18  In this section, I describe 
the context of mindset behind the strong adherence to maintaining 
hierarchical social structures and promoting organizational interests, 
which, in this case, were prioritized over protecting the lives of the 
Japanese public. 
 
In the postwar period from 1945, Japan achieved remarkable 
economic growth, overtaking West Germany to become the second 
largest economy after the United States as early as 1968.  In 1979, 
an American scholar, Ezra F. Vogel, published Japan as Number 
One Lessons for America19 in order to warn US business leaders and 
policymakers about this new global economic competitor.  Yet, the 
book became a bestseller and more widely read in Japan than in the 
US, hitting the sweet spot of the Japanese psyche, which had longed 
to catch up with the West since the Meiji Restoration.  They had 
now not only caught up, but had surpassed the West.  However, 
amongst some this pride was accompanied by complacency and 
arrogance.  The inertia of the postwar successes became widespread.  
Institutional collusion and negligence by nuclear regulatory 
agencies fostered the safety myth of nuclear power, exacerbated by 
the groupthink mindset.  Japan serves as a prime example of why 
upholding the obligation to dissent within organizations is crucial to 
maintaining a healthy democracy—and how its absence can be fatal 
in times of national crisis. 
 
After World War II, Japan was able to reach high levels of 
economic growth through the Iron Triangle of government, industry 
and bureaucracy, as well as academia and media.  The tightly knit 
system of Japan Inc. enabled the defeated country to concentrate its 
energies into one national effort and contributed greatly to Japan’s 
economic success.  The idea of a rich country and strong army that 
drove the Meiji government to militarize was refocused on 
economic growth and building up export-led industries.  METI and 
                                               
18 DAVID PILLING, BENDING ADVERSITY: JAPAN AND THE ART OF SURVIVAL 260 
(2014).  
19 EZRA F. VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE LESSONS FOR AMERICA (1979). 
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its predecessor MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) 
took industrial policies that successfully promoted automotive 
manufacturing and steel production.  Japanese companies worked 
together by maintaining close horizontal and vertical ties through 
the keiretsu system, in which a main bank provided finance, 
companies held cross-shareholdings and kept close ties with 
suppliers.  Within corporations, the salarymen enjoyed the stability 
of lifetime employment, so long as they fit neatly within the 
seniority-based hierarchy and toed the company line. 
 
As Japanese companies, such as Toyota, quickly rose to become 
major competitors to global businesses, many scholars and 
intellectuals tried to understand the distinctive elements of Japanese 
organizations and culture that allowed them to reach such levels of 
success.  In MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of 
Industrial Policy, 1925-1975, Chalmers Johnson explained that 
Japan’s cultural values and ways of conducting business and trade 
was fundamentally different from Western ones.20  In Cartels of the 
Mind Japan’s Intellectual Closed Shop, an American scholar 
describes the insular perspective of the Japanese intellectual 
establishment.21  Karel Van Wolferen, a journalist and expert on 
Japanese affairs, provided similar analyses in The Enigma of 
Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation22 and 
Ningen-o-kōfuku-ni-shinai-nihon-to-iu-shisutemu [False Realities of 
a Politicized Society].23 
 
A Japanese scholar of Sociology, Chie Nakane, wrote scholarly 
books on the hierarchical social relations and ordering of Japanese 
organizations, such as Tate-shakai-no-ningen-kankei [Japanese 
Vertically Structured Society] and Tate-shakai-no–rikigaku 
                                               
20 CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975 (1982).  
21 IVAN P. HALL, CARTELS OF THE MIND JAPAN'S INTELLECTUAL CLOSED SHOP 
(1998). 
22 KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER: PEOPLE AND 
POLITICS IN A STATELESS NATION (1989). 
23 KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, NINGEN-O-KŌFUKU-NI-SHINAI-NIHON-TO-IU-
SHISUTEMU [FALSE REALITIES OF A POLITICIZED SOCIETY], (Masaru Shinohara 
trans., 1994) (Japan). 
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[Dynamics of Vertical Society],24 pointing to the social structures of 
collective behavior as restraining individuality and the potential for 
Japanese to play dynamic roles on the international stage, in areas 
other than economics.  Even earlier, Ruth Benedict published The 
Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946),25 based on her study on 
Japan during WWII.  Originally conducted to gather information on 
the behavior of Japanese for the U.S. Office of War Information, her 
influential study outlined concepts such as obligation and shame in 
Japanese society that became the starting point for many subsequent 
studies on Japan.   
 
Others have made observations on a larger scale, classifying Japan 
as an entity in itself.  In his controversial theory of clashing 
civilizations, Samuel P. Huntington even deemed Japan as being 
one out of “seven or eight major civilizations” of the world, which 
he argued was “defined both by common objective elements, such 
as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the 
subjective self-identification of people.”26 
 
VI. Groupthink Mindset 
 
Categorizing Japan as a having its own civilization may be extreme.  
However, it can be said that, as with all societies, there are many 
norms in Japanese society which have been taught and learned over 
generations and have developed out of a particular historical and 
social context.  In the case of Japan, many of the encouraged norms 
of social behavior happen to coincide with some elements of 
groupthink, a term coined by Yale University psychology professor, 
Irving L. Janis27.  Inspired by the term doublethink, which was used 
by George Orwell in his dystopian novel, 1984,28 as the act of non-
                                               
24 CHIE NAKANE, TATE-SHAKAI-NO-NINGEN-KANKEI [JAPANESE VERTICALLY 
STRUCTURED SOCIETY] (1969) (Japan); CHIE NAKANE, TATE-SHAKAI-NO–
RIKIGAKU [DYNAMICS OF VERTICAL SOCIETY] (1978) (Japan). 
25 RUTH BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD: PATTERNS OF 
JAPANESE CULTURE (1946). 
26 Samuel P. Huntington, 1993 (Summer), "The Clash of 
Civilizations?," FOREIGN AFFAIRS 72(3):22-49. 
27 IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS 
AND FIASCOES (1982). 
28 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949) (U.K.). 
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critically believing in two contradictory ideas, Janis used groupthink 
to explain the phenomenon of rationalized conformity in decision 
making within political and corporate circles. The corporate culture 
of relative cohesiveness and insularity that tended to be fostered 
through the postwar Japanese model of employment in mammoth 
corporations and governmental organizations made people more 
prone to the groupthink mindset of discouraging dissent and 
criticism.  
 
In Japan, many social norms and activities tend to revolve around 
the organization to which one belongs, particularly based on 
university education and employment.  The lifetime employment 
model and the seniority system, common to Japanese companies 
and bureaucracies, incentivize employees to spend most of their 
adult life in one organization.  Even if lifetime employment is no 
longer guaranteed in Japan’s recession economy, most employers 
still assume that employees are willing to dedicate a lifetime of 
work to their organizations.   
 
On the everyday level, such behaviors can be observed in social 
interactions.  For example, when people introduce themselves 
amongst other Japanese at a dinner or social event in Tokyo, the 
first words exchanged are often the names of their companies, along 
with carefully presented business cards, before their names or 
professions.  The expectation is that the company and one’s position 
within it comes first, rather than one’s profession or field.  In 
contrast, at international social gatherings in places such as New 
York or London, people would more likely mention their names and 
professions first, followed by their companies or organizations and 
institutions at which they work.  Peer pressure to conform is a core 
part of organizations in Japan, and this behavior is taught at an early 
age, starting even in kindergarten. 
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Figure 1—Comparison of the Order in Japan and Many Western 
Countries 
 
As illustrated in the image above, Figure 1,29 in Japan, many people 
are likely to view themselves in relation to the organizational 
structure to which they belong, while in other countries, people may 
tend to identify themselves by their individual professions and 
display greater risk-taking and competitive behavior.  It could be 
said that in Japan inequality is less prevalent but there are also fewer 
chances for individuals to jump to the top. The company-centered, 
rigid job market also makes it more difficult for people to have a 
diversified career with experience working in multiple 
organizations.  Even a mid-career engineer with a high level of 
expertise would face difficulties in moving between Japanese 
companies.  In most companies, there are also close relations 
between labor unions and company management.  These norms and 
institutional pressures can function as binding mechanisms that 
inhibit employees from stepping out of line with the company’s 
direction and views.  
 
                                               
29 KIYOSHI KUROKAWA, KISEI-NO-TORIKO: GURU ̄PU-SHINKU-GA-NIHON-WO-
HOROBOSU [Regulatory Capture: When Groupthink Can Kill] (2013) (Japan). 
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In the Japanese nuclear power sector, it is arguable that this mindset 
was widespread in the nuclear villages and made it more acceptable 
for employees and people involved in the nuclear industry to 
prioritize the industry’s bottom line over public safety.  In addition 
to the formal collusion between the regulators and operators, the 
social and institutional norms were significant underlying factors 
that provided the groundwork for the manmade disaster of 
Fukushima to occur  
 
Let’s be clear on one point—this does not mean that culture must be 
static.  On the contrary, it is of utmost importance to critically 
question these norms, into which most people have been socialized 
from an early age.  The combination of collusion, negligence by 
those in positions of power and a long history of institutional norms 
surely increased the likelihood that such an accident would happen 
in Japan on March 11, 2011.  But I raise these points not merely as a 
defeatist commentary on Japan’s woes, but as a call for change and 
a plea to individuals to be more critical, to dissent when necessary 
and to save the nation from another crisis. 
 
VII. Responsibility for the Accident: Institutions and 
individuals 
 
In the final report of the Commission, specific individuals were not 
singled out to take the blame for the accident.  However, this was 
not in order to let those in power off the hook.  I will examine the 
problem of the lack of individual responsibility and accountability 
shortly.  But first, I must clarify that the intention of the 
Commission was to draw attention to the startling fact that Japan 
lacked a comprehensive plan for crisis management.  A crisis 
management plan is a basic requirement that any country utilizing 
nuclear power must establish, particularly one that is prone to 
earthquakes and other natural disasters.  No investigative body had 
pointed to this gaping hole, nor scrutinized the institutional features 
of the regulatory framework and crisis management guidelines.   
 
The responsibility of the individual leaders must be pursued, but the 
lack of a national strategy must also be pointed out.  These are two 
different points, both of which are significant, but require separate 
inquiries.  This Commission focused on the institutional elements.  
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The Executive Summary of the NAIIC Report states, “The 
underlying issue is the social structure that results in ‘regulatory 
capture,’ and the organizational, institutional, and legal framework 
that allows individuals to justify their own actions, hide them when 
inconvenient, and leave no records in order to avoid 
responsibility.”30 
 
In this way, the Commission deemed that if the structures of 
regulatory capture are not reformed, new individuals could easily 
fill the positions of authority and make the same mistakes as their 
predecessors.  From the perspective of crisis management, 
regardless of who the individual leaders are, there must be a set of 
comprehensive plans that can be implemented at any moment in 
time.  Especially at the national level, it goes without saying that 
crisis management must be carefully planned by those with expert 
knowledge and experience. 
 
I will mention though, the investigation did find and conclude that, 
especially in the critical period immediately after the accident, 
individuals at the top levels in the government, TEPCO and NISA 
failed to take the necessary steps to prevent or limit the damage.  
The Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency 
Preparedness designated NISA as the main organization to take the 
lead in crisis situations, but it quickly became clear that they had no 
such capabilities and were unprepared and dysfunctional.  The 
Prime Minister’s Office stepped in, but in doing so, broke the 
planned chain of command and caused confusion, while failing to 
declare a state of emergency immediately or informing the public of 
the severity of the accident.  The President of TEPCO did not even 
conduct the basic task of reporting to the Prime Minister’s Office, 
the activities and intentions of the operators at the plant.  In no way 
does the NAIIC Report ignore the wrongdoings or waive the 
responsibilities of these individuals. 
 
VIII. The Lack of Accountability and Transparency 
 
This leads to an important point about the accountability of 
governmental and corporate leaders in Japan.  The lack of 
                                               
30 NAIIC Report, Executive Summary, supra note 11, at 21. 
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transparency in the decision-making processes of the government 
and relevant bodies during the Fukushima accident has cost them 
the trust of the international community.  In any organization, the 
greater authority must come with the greater responsibility and 
accountability.  Unfortunately, the meaning of accountability was 
lost in translation when imported into the Japanese language.  The 
English word accountability is translated as the responsibility to 
explain in Japanese, which does not convey the same level of 
seriousness.   
 
In English, the meaning of accountability goes one step beyond 
responsibility, signifying the act of carrying out the responsibility 
that comes with the role.  In How the Mighty Fall And Why Some 
Companies Never Give In31, Jim Collins also indicates the 
significance of the meaning and implications of accountability.  
Often in Japanese organizations, after major corporate or political 
scandals, those at the top are able to placate critics by fulfilling the 
responsibility to explain, consisting of apologizing and bowing at 
press conferences.  The problems are soon swept under the carpet 
only to remain unresolved.  This too, was the case after the 
Fukushima accident. 
 
Kiyoshi Yamamoto explores the concept of accountability and how 
the meaning was lost in his academic work, Akauntabiriti-wo-
kangaeru-dōshite-“setsumeisekinin”-ni-natta-noka [Thinking about 
Accountability—Why It Became “Responsibility to Explain”].32  
Similar to Professor Chie Nakane, he discusses the vagueness of the 
role of responsibility within Japanese social and power structures.  
He argues that the Fukushima nuclear accident and WWII were 
typical cases in Japan, in which responsibility was vague and never 
pursued.  Furthermore, he asserts that the disciplinary aspect of the 
word accountability is rarely used in the Japanese translation.  He 
                                               
31 JIM COLLINS, HOW THE MIGHTY FALL AND WHY SOME COMPANIES NEVER 
GIVE IN (2009) (U.K.). 
32 KIYOSHI YAMAMOTO, AKAUNTABIRITI-WO-KANGAERU-DO ̄SHITE-
“SETSUMEISEKININ”-NI-NATTA-NOKA [THINKING ABOUT ACCOUNTABILITY—
WHY IT BECAME “RESPONSIBILITY TO EXPLAIN”] (2013) (Japan). 
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draws attention to the sharp contrast between how accountability is 
viewed by leaders in the United States and in Japan.  To indicate the 
importance attached to accountability in governance in the US, he 
gives examples such as the renaming of the General Accounting 
Office, which is under the authority of Congress, to the Government 
Accountability Office in 2004.   
 
He goes on to examine accountability in Japanese society, taking 
into consideration the particular elements of the social fabric.  Issues 
in Japanese society, such as the Fukushima nuclear disaster, the 
Olympus scandal33 , and bullying in Japanese schools prompted Mr. 
Yamamoto to study this topic. In recent years, a slew of corporate 
scandals in Japanese firms have emerged, from Toshiba which 
inflated net profit figures to Kobe Steel which falsified certifications 
on the strength of its metals.34 These scandals and others,35 reflect a 
corporate culture in which the difficulty to criticize superiors leads 
to issues being swept under the carpet, with little transparency or 
accountability. 
 
VIV. Overcoming Groupthink and Reforming Corporate 
Culture 
 
For the true meaning of accountability to be accepted and for reform 
to take place in Japan, the groupthink village mentality that has 
dominated corporate and institutional culture must be changed.  I 
have tried to raise awareness of the need to change this mindset by 
speaking about the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster and the 
findings of the Commission.  The obligation to dissent is extremely 
important in any organization, whether in the private or public 
sector.  Rather than taking the passive attitude that nothing can be 
                                               
33 MICHAEL WOODFORD, EXPOSURE—INSIDE THE OLYMPUS SCANDAL: HOW I 
WENT FROM CEO TO WHISTLEBLOWER (2012) (U.K.). 
34 Peter Wells and Leo Lewis, Japan Inc: a corporate culture on trial after 
scandals, The Financial Times (Jan. 3, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/26d4843a-e743-11e7-97e2-916d4fbac0da  
35 See Appendix B 
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changed, it is critical to express one’s opinions regardless of one’s 
age and position.  In the book, Winning,36 Jack Welch, the President 
and CEO of GE, has also pointed out the obligation to dissent as a 
significant element of corporate culture for successful companies. 
 
Changing one’s mindset is also important for positive growth for 
both businesses and individuals.  A 2017 McKinsey study touched 
upon the effects of norms and mindsets in the office on performance 
and growth. It showed that cultural norms and perceptions had a 
significant effect on employees’ ability to implement new business 
strategies in digital technology. Even employees’ skill levels in 
digital technology mattered less for their performance compared to 
their attitudes and behavioral norms. One suggestion for building a 
new corporate culture, according to the study, is to hire senior level 
people from outside of the company to ‘’help inject disruptive 
thinking that is a source of innovative energy and 
empowerment.’’37This could be a key first step in the road to 
changing attitudes and overcoming groupthink.  
 
Some people who visit Japan from abroad are surprised by the 
stability of Japan despite many decades of recession and the 2011 
nuclear and natural disasters.  Indeed, the Japanese public, 
particularly those whose homes were destroyed after March 11, 
have shown incredible strength and endurance.  But, if there are 
major accidents or problems in the future in other areas, Japan will 
likely make the same mistakes again, become isolated and lose the 
trust of the international community.  In times of crisis, the fragility 
of the antiquated structures of Japanese society will be exposed with 
little to hold them up. As Anthony Fitzsimmons and Derek Atkins 
observe in their book, Rethinking Reputational Risk, How to 
manage the risks that can ruin your business, your reputation and 
you, ‘’Typically a crisis has multiple root causes, often systemic, 
that remained unrecognized and unmanaged but gradually 
                                               
36 JACK WELCH & SUZY WELCH, WINNING (2005). 
37 Julie Goran, Laura LaBerge, and Ramesh Srinivasan, Culture for a digital age, 
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accumulated, unnoticed over years. . . .’’38 Leaving these decaying 
pillars as they are will allow more crises like Fukushima will arise, 
in other areas and sectors.  I can only hope that each and every one 
of the Japanese public will consider this seriously and have a 
heightened awareness of Japan’s future. 
 
X. Lessons from Fukushima: Crisis to Opportunity 
 
It has been seven years since the devastating tragedy of the March 
11 earthquake and tsunami and the Fukushima nuclear power plant 
disaster.  Japan must seize the opportunity to change and to be 
responsible to its public and to the international community.  The 
historical and social context of Japan made it well-positioned for 
such an accident to occur, but the structures of groupthink and 
collusion can form in many places around the world.  In terms of 
governance, the lessons from the disaster can be applied to many 
areas where the lack of transparency may be an issue.  Moreover, as 
more nuclear power plants are being built around the world, the 
lessons from Fukushima must be applied and the knowledge gained 
must be harnessed in order to prevent future nuclear disasters.   
 
Finally, this independent Commission can serve as a model for 
future investigations to probe issues of significance to the everyday 
lives of Japanese citizens.  Having served as the chairman of the 
first independent investigation commission mandated by parliament 
in Japan (and the only one to date), it is my sincere hope that the 
democratic spirit of the Commission will continue, through the 
individual awareness and actions of the Japanese people. 
 
Note: This paper is based on presentation and discussion by Dr. 
Kurokawa at the conference held by the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School, Center for Asian Law on November 19 and 20, 2015.39 
                                               
38 ANTHONY FITZSIMMONS & DEREK ATKINS, RETHINKING REPUTATIONAL RISK: 
HOW TO MANAGE THE RISKS THAT CAN RUIN YOUR BUSINESS, YOUR 
REPUTATION AND YOU 28 (2017). 
39 University of Pennsylvania Law School, Center of Asian Law, Earthquakes, 
Nuclear Meltdowns, and Chemical Spills: Legal Responses to Disasters in the 
US and Asia, 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cal/conferences/legalresponsestodisaster/ 
[https://perma.cc/KN32-2WL7]. 
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The Commission’s Seven Policy Recommendations 40 
 
1. “Monitoring of the nuclear regulatory body by the National 
Diet: A permanent committee to deal with issues regarding 
nuclear power must be established in the National Diet in 
order to supervise the regulators to secure the safety of the 
public.” 
2. “Reform the crisis management system: A fundamental 
reexamination of the crisis management system must be 
made.  The boundaries dividing the responsibilities of the 
national and local governments and the operators must be 
made clear.” 
3. “Government responsibility for public health and welfare: 
Regarding the responsibility to protect public health, the 
following must be implemented as soon as possible. (1) A 
system must be established to deal with long-term public 
health effects, including stress-related illness. Medical 
diagnosis and treatment should be covered by state funding. 
Information should be disclosed with public health and 
safety as the priority, instead of government convenience. 
This information must be comprehensive for use by 
individual residents to make informed decisions. (2) 
Continued monitoring of hotspots and the spread of 
radioactive contamination must be undertaken to protect 
communities and the public. Measures to prevent any 
potential spread should also be implemented. (3) The 
government must establish a detailed and transparent 
program of decontamination and relocation, as well as 
provide information so that all residents will be 
knowledgeable about their compensation options.” 
4. “Monitoring the operators: TEPCO must undergo 
fundamental corporate changes, including strengthening its 
governance, working towards building an organizational 
culture which prioritizes safety, changing its stance on 
information disclosure, and establishing a system which 
                                               
40 NAIIC Report, Executive Summary, supra note 11, at 22-23. 
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prioritizes the site.  In order to prevent the Federation of 
Electric Power Companies (FEPC) from being used as a 
route for negotiating with regulatory agencies, new 
relationships among the electric power companies must also 
be established—built on safety issues, mutual supervision 
and transparency.” 
5. “Criteria for the new regulatory body: The new regulatory 
organization must adhere to the following conditions.  It 
must be: Independent . . . Transparent . . . Professional . . . 
Consolidated . . . Proactive . . . ” 
6. “Reforming laws related to nuclear energy: Laws concerning 
nuclear issues must be thoroughly reformed.” 
7. “Develop a system of independent investigation 
commissions: A system for appointing independent 
investigation committees, including experts largely from the 
private sector, must be developed to deal with unresolved 
issues, including, but not limited to, the decommissioning 
process of reactors, dealing with spent fuel issues, limiting 
accident effects and decontamination.”  
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Japanese Blue Chip Companies Involved in Recent Scandals41  
 
1. 2011 Olympus Corporation: accounting fraud  
2. 2015 Toyo Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd.: falsified performance 
data for earthquake resistant products 
3. 2015 Toshiba Corporation: inflated net profits by $1.3bn 
over a seven year period   
4. 2015 Asahi Kasei Construction Materials Corp.: falsified 
data on building foundation piles  
5. 2015 Takata Corporation: misrepresented inflator data 
6. 2016 Mitsubishi Motors Corporation: inflated fuel economy 
data by up to 15 percent  
7. 2016 Suzuki Motors Corporation: fuel economy testing 
methods were not compliant with Japanese domestic 
standards  
8. 2017 Nissan Motor Company Ltd.: domestic car inspections 
carried out by unqualified technicians  
9. 2017 Subaru Corporation: domestic car inspections carried 
out by unqualified technicians 
10. 2017 Kobe Steel, Ltd.: gave false certifications to its metals 
and products 
11. 2017 Toray Industries, Inc.: data falsification for tires and 
various auto parts  
 
 
                                               
41 Kana Inagaki & Leo Lewis, String of Scandals Puts Japanese Investors on 
Edge, The Financial Times (May 29, 2016), 
https://www.ft.com/content/89c00e1c-2263-11e6-9d4d-c11776a5124d 
[https://perma.cc/NA6D-2LLE]. 
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